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The US is the largest source of FDI, accounting for 24% of the world’s outward stock. Now that 
Congress and the new presidential administration are putting forward plans for reforming the 
corporate tax regime, and especially the way multinational enterprises (MNEs) are taxed on their 
foreign earnings, we should consider the effects of these plans on FDI flows and the behavior of 
MNEs. 
At the moment, US MNEs face income tax liabilities for the profits of their foreign affiliates, 
with a deduction for the taxes paid in host countries. Since payment is deferred until the income 
is returned to the US—and because the corporate tax rate in the US (35%) is higher than in most 
other countries—companies tend to accumulate earnings abroad to avoid a large tax bill at home. 
By the latest estimates, US companies hold US$2.343 trillion abroad in “reinvested foreign 
earnings.”1 Half of these have been reinvested in productive assets, as is common practice for 
MNEs anywhere;
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A reform that addresses this distortion should have short-term and long-term effects on FDI 
flows. To begin with, there are plans to bring back the earnings accumulated abroad by 
substituting the tax liability for a one-off toll.
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 If companies perceive this offer as time-limited, 
as it was the case with the American Jobs Creation Act (AJCA) in 2004, the amounts repatriated 
could be very high. For instance, assuming that the final deal only attracts half of the reinvested 
foreign earnings kept in liquid assets (or 25% of the total), the repatriation would be US$600 
billion, double the average annual FDI outflows from the US over the past few years. The reform 
should try to spread this repatriation across several years, but the annual US FDI flows (and 
those of some other countries) would still be severely distorted.
5
 
What will parent companies do with this one-off inflow? The objective of the reform is to 
increase investment in the US. But most of the accumulated foreign earnings are owned by large 
information technology and pharmaceutical companies that can already access as much capital as 
they want in the US.
6
 It is more likely that the funds will be used to reduce debt, pay dividends or 
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engage in large share buy-backs. It may also increase the appetite for domestic acquisitions, 
already high among technology firms. Regulators and market players should be aware of 
potential disruptions that a sudden inflow could create in financial markets. 
In the long term, the reform is likely to reduce the incentives to keep future foreign earnings 
abroad, bringing the reinvestment rate of US foreign affiliates in line with those of the rest of the 
world. This should affect mostly the type of reinvested earnings kept in liquid assets in low-tax 
territories. But even a marginal impact on the decision to reinvest in productive assets would be 
felt in some host countries: reinvested earnings by US MNEs account for 19% of total FDI 
inflows in Mexico, for example.
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 These effects also may be seen between two non-US 
economies, as foreign affiliates of US MNEs have less capital to invest in other countries. 
A second aspect concerns the effect on the global efforts to prevent tax avoidance by MNEs 
through profit shifting.  If the reform brings the US corporate rate more in line with that of other 
large economies, it will reduce a significant distortion in the global corporate tax system. But 
unless the corporate tax is eliminated, US companies (like those of other countries) will still have 
an incentive to shift profits to tax havens.  
Overall, US corporate tax reform is likely to generate large FDI flows, as companies unwind 
their stocks of reinvested foreign earnings. Lower corporate tax may increase investments in the 
US in the long-run, but little of the repatriated foreign earnings will be invested in productive 
capacity However, if it reduces the incentive that US companies shift profits abroad, this reform 
could help to harmonize international tax regulations and discourage aggressive tax planning. 
The US and other governments should seize this chance to continue the cooperation on this 
agenda. 
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